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ECONOMIC 
NOTES
If there is one single theme that continues 
to run through the Fraser government’s 
approach to economic policy, it is that real 
wages in Australia are too high and profits 
are too low. Economic recovery and a 
reduction in unemployment can only come 
about when the share of output going to wage 
and salary earners has been sufficiently 
reduced, the government argues.
As well as consistently pursuing this 
policy before the Arbitration Commission, 
the government is also applying it to its own 
workers and attempting to discipline 
individual firms which, for the sake of 
industrial peace, feel it is in their interests to 
grant more to their own workers than the so- 
called wage indexation “ guidelines” allow. 
The crusade is to get the profit share back to 
the value it had in some (ill-defined) golden 
age.
Is there anything in this position?
Real Wages: Level or Share?
Before looking at the evidence it is 
necessary to sort out some confusion in the 
debate about real wages. For a start, there 
are two ways of looking at wages in real 
terms. The first is the level of real wages; 
that is, the purchasing power of the wage — 
or, what is the same thing, the money wage 
divided by some consumer price index.
Now there is argument about how this 
measurement should be carried out, but most 
of it is of a technical nature. Which of the 
available measures of wages should be used? 
Which price index most accurately reflects 
what is really happening to the prices wage 
earners pay? These are important questions, 
particularly if there is a redistribution of
income going on within the group of wage 
and salary earners at the same time as there 
is a shift of resources away from this group 
as a whole towards profit-receivers. 
However, the main controversy at the 
moment is about this latter shift.
The share of national income going to 
profits can increase even if the level of real 
wages remains constant — so long as 
national income itself increases. In an 
economy expanding at, say five per cent a
Table 1. Gross non-farm product at 
constan t (19 74 /5 ) prices, sea son a lly  
adjusted, percentage increase on previous 
quarter.
Quarter
Percentage
increase
September 1975 — 1.04
December 1975 -  1.39
March 1976 2.96
June 1976 0.41
September 1976 2.13
December 1976 0.92
March 1977 — 0.45
June 1977 0.58
September 1977 1.28
December 1977 — 0.74
March 1978 2.27
June 1978 — 0.06
September 1978 0.49
December 1978 1.51
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year, real wages and real profits must both 
increase by this five per cent gain in 
productivity if the existing shares of 
national income are to be maintained. If the 
level of real wages is held constant, all this 
increase in productivity accrues to profits, 
and so the profit share increases rapidly. 
Naturally, if the level of real wages also 
falls, the profit share can increase even more 
rapidly.
A more or less painless way exists, then, 
for governments to increase the profit share 
in an expanding economy. Real wages have 
to be held constant (or at least increase less 
rapidly than productivity) so that the 
benefits of greater production go to profit- 
receivers. This is the effect of an equitably 
administered system of full wage (and tax) 
indexation.
If, however, the economy is not expanding 
very rapidly this shift to profits will be slow. 
A system of full indexation, as envisaged by 
the Labor government in 1975, would have 
increased the profit share but too slowly for 
those who stood to benefit, since the economy 
was, and has remained, stagnant — as Table 
1 illustrates.
In the period covered by Table 1, Gross 
non-farm product grew at an average annual 
rate of only about three per cent per year, 
compared to an average of 5.7 per cent in the 
previous eight years. To quickly increase the 
profit share in such circumstances required 
an actual reduction in real wages. Has this 
been achieved?
The most commonly used measure of 
wages in Australia is the quarterly Average 
Weekly Earnings (AWE) series, which is 
derived by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics from payroll tax returns. Despite 
its limitations (it includes, for example, the 
earnings of managerial and executive staff, 
and even directors’ fees) it is our best regular 
and more or less complete report of wage and 
salary incomes, and is the measure I have 
used here.
If, for each quarter, we discount the 
increase in Average Weekly Earnings by the 
Consumer Price Index we obtain a series of 
quarterly changes in the level of real wages, 
as in Table 2. _
We see that in the four years from 
December 1974 to December 1978 real wages 
fell about as often as they rose, with the falls,
Table 2. Percentage changes in Average
Weekly Earnings, the Consumer Price Index
and real wages, December 1974 to December
1 Q 7 ft
Percentage change in
Quarter
AWE
December 1974 5.3
March 1975 2.0
June 1975 2.8
September 1975 2.4
December 1975 5.3
March 1976 1.9
June 1976 4.9
September 1976 3.2
December 1976 1.5
March 1977 2.5
June 1977 3.1
September 1977 3.3
December 1977 0.3
March 1978 3.8
June 1978 1.2
September 1978 2.3
| December 1978 0.2
on average, being larger. In December 1974 
Average Weekly Earnings stood at $148.00. 
In the next four years prices went up 53.6 per 
cent, so to keep up, Average Weekly Earnings 
would have had to reach $227.37 in December 
1978. Instead, Average Weekly Earnings in 
December 1978 were only $221.00. Real 
wages then have fallen, on average, $6.37.
In the same period, output per worker has 
gone up 23.4 per cent, from $453.36 to $559.48 
a week. (1) This increase in productivity plus 
the cut in real wages has meant a substantial 
increase in the profit share and a reduction in 
the wage share over the period, as Table 3 
shows.
In Figure 1 these two measures of the 
attack on real wages are compared. In the 
upper part of the diagram, quarter on quarter 
changes in real wages are shown, while the 
graph shows labor’s resultant share. It is 
clear that the wage share of national income 
has been steadily falling over the period 
depicted, even in those quarters when there 
was a slight increase in real wages. Of 
course, big reductions in the level of real 
wages accelerate this process, as for example
CPI ‘Realwages’
3.7 1.6
3.6 -  1.6
3.5 - 0 . 7
0.8 1.6
5.6 - 0 . 3
3.0 — 1.1
2.5 2.4
2.2 1.0
6.0 - 4 . 5
2.3 0.2
2.4 0.7
2.0 1.3
2.3 -  2.0
1.3 2.5
2.1 - 0 . 9
1.9 0.4
2.3 - 2 . 1
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Table 3. Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage of gross domestic product at 
factor cost.
Quarter L abor’ s share
June 1975 65.05
September 1975 65.09
December 1975 64.83
March 1976 63.80
June 1976 64.09
September 1976 63.15
December 1976 62.53
March 1977 62.75
June 1977 63.25
September 1977 63.17
December 1977 62.85
March 1978 62.57
June 1978 62.40
September 1978 61.30
December 1978 58.16
occurred in the December quarter of 1976, 
and again in the December quarter of last 
year.
The Historical Record
So far we have established that real wages 
have been falling for the last four years — in 
a period in which there has been, as yet, no 
sustained economic recovery. But this may 
be because wages have not fallen far enough
— or at least this is what the “real wage 
overhang” school argue. (2)
There are two ways of dealing with this 
argument. The first involves re-examining 
the evidence to see whether there has been a 
long-term trend for labor’s share of the 
national income to increase past some 
historical “natural average”. The second 
consists of assessing possible other causes 
for the dramatic fall in investment Australia 
has experienced in the recent past.
To start with the evidence, it seems at first 
sight that there has been an increase in 
labor’s share over the post-war period in 
Australia. Table 4 uses the same measure of 
the wage share as Table 3, but this time is 
based on annual, rather than quarterly, 
data.
T able 4. Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage o f gross domestic product at 
factor cost, 1948/9 to 1977/78.
Y ear Wage share
48/9 55.8
49/50 53.9
50/51 50.3
51/2 61.1
52/3 57.3
53/4 56.0
54/5 57.8
55/6 58.5
56/7 57.0
57/8 58.3
58/9 56.8
59/60 57.1
60/1 57.8
61/2 58.0
62/3 56-6
63/4 55.4
64/5 56.4
65/6 58.3
66/7 57.6
67/8 58.9
68/9 58.0
69/70 58.9
70/71 61.4
71/2 60.7
72/3 59.5
73/4 60.8
74/5 65.5
75/6 64.6
76/7 63.0
77/8 62.8
However, this historical series is 
misleading for two reasons, and should be 
m odified. The first, more or less 
uncontroversial inadequacy of Table 4 is the 
fact that it overlooks significant changes in 
the class structure of Australia. While these 
changes can be overlooked in a short-run 
analysis, as we did above, if we want to look 
at a trend over a thirty year period we must 
take into account the shift that has occurred 
in Australia from self-employment to wage 
labor.
To see how such a shift can distort the 
evidence on labor’s share, consider the case 
of a shopkeeper who is forced to sell his or her 
business and gets a job, say, in the local 
supermarket. Even though, we suppose, no 
other changes occur in the economy, there 
will be an apparent increase in the wage 
share of national income and a drop in the 
profit share. This is because all the income of 
self-employed people is allocated to profits in 
the national account statistics we have been 
using.
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In the 1947 Census, self-employed people 
made up 12.5 per cent of the workforce; in 
1971 this percentage had fallen to 7.3. There 
had also been a drop in the percentage of 
employers (most of whom are, in fact, small 
employers, employing only a few workers) 
from 9.3 to 5.3 per cent of the workforce.
How can we correct our data to take this 
effect into account? One way is to adjust the 
whole series in Table 4 by selecting one 
particular distribution of the workforce into 
employers, self-employed and employees (I 
chose the 1971 Census figures) and re­
calculating labor’s share in other years.
For example, in 1954,17.9 per cent of the 
workforce were employers or self-employed, 
compared to 12.6 in 1971, a drop of 5.3 per 
cent. To calculate what would have been 
labor’s share in 1954 i f  the class structure in 
that year had been the same as it was in 1971, 
we have to adjust the wage share in 1954 by 
adding part of the income of that 5.3 per cent 
of the workforce to wages. There is room for 
argument over what fraction of the income of 
small employers and the self-employed 
should be allocated in this way. I have 
chosen to regard the wage portion of this 
income as simply equal to the ruling average 
wage, with all additional income allocated to 
profits.
This seems reasonable and is equivalent to 
assuming that our shopkeeper, having been 
forced out of business, receives the average 
wage in his or her new job.
Table 5 shows the result of re-calculating 
labor’s share for each year from 1948/9 to 
1977/8. Since census data is only available 
for 1947, 1954, 1966 and 1971, additional 
assumptions had to be made about trends in 
the structure of the workforce for other years; 
I simply assumed a constant trend between 
censuses and extrapolated the trend between 
1966 and 1971 up to the present.
The clear upward trend visible in Table 4 
has now all but disappeared, suggesting that 
it was mainly the effect of changes in the 
composition of the workforce rather than a 
consequence of a shift in income from profit 
receivers to wage earners. Of course, Table 5 
does show fluctuations in labor’s share. 
These are a consequence of class struggle 
within Australia and of external shocks to 
the Australian economy. While not wishing 
to ignore these fluctuations and the factors
T able 5, Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage o f gross domestic product at 
factor cost, adjusted for changes in 
workforce composition (Ba„e: 1971), 1948/9 
to 1977/8.
Y ear W age share
48/9 60.6
49/50 58.3
50/1 54.2
51/2 65.7
52/3 61.4
53/4 59.8
54/5 61.5
55/6 62.1
56/7 60.3
57/8 61.5
58/9 59.7
59/60 59.8
60/1 60.4
61/2 60.4
62/3 58.7
63/4 57.3
64/5 58.2
65/6 59.9
66/7 59.0
67/8 60.1
68/9 58.9
39/70 59.5
70/1 61.7
71/2 60.7
72/3 59.2
73/4 60.2
74/5 64.5
75/6 63.3
76/7 61.5
77/8 61.0
which caused them, it seems that the 
evidence is that there has been no marked 
change in the underlying division of 
national income between workers and 
capitalists over the post-war period.
The Tax Man Cometh
So far, we have been examining Labor’s 
share of the national income without taking 
into account the redistributive effects of 
taxation. This is only realistic if wage 
earners and profit receivers have paid, over 
the period we are interested in, roughly the 
same proportion of their incomes in taxes 
and received roughly the same proportion 
back in benefits. However, there is a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that wage earners 
are paying a much greater share of the tax 
burden ^ind that governm ents are 
intervening more and more in the interests of 
the corporate sector.
24 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 69
To quantify all these effects — even for a 
single year — is very complex and to do so 
over the whole post-war period would be well 
beyond the scope of these Notes. However, it 
is worthwhile looking at the most important 
aggregates and seeing how they have 
changed to shift resources back to profit 
receivers.
The main tax paid by wage and salary 
earners is Pay As You Earn (PAYE) income 
tax, and it is providing an increasing portion 
of government income. We should therefore 
subtract PAYE deductions in order to arrive 
at a real, after tax figure for labor’s share of 
the national income. At the same time, we 
should add back those cash benefits workers 
receive from government, such as pensions, 
unemployment benefits and the like. This 
gives a rough measure of the redistributive 
effects of government taxes and benefits,
though I should emphasise it leaves out 
many other aspects of state intervention in 
the distribution of income. It is only justified 
by the fact that the two quantities we are 
considering — net PAYE contributions of 
wage and salary earners and cash benefits to 
persons — tend to dominate the government 
income and expenditure.
Table 6 shows net PAYE payments, cash 
benefits to persons and the difference 
between the two, expressed as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost. 
From 1958/59 (3) to 1964/5 benefits exceeded 
PAYE deductions but from 1965/6 the 
working class has received less back in cash 
benefits than it has paid in income tax.
If this redistributive effect is taken into 
account, as in Table 7, a picture emerges of 
the long term evolution of labor’s real share 
of national income. From the evidence there
Table 6. Net PAYE payments, cash 
benefits to persons and the difference as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product at 
factor cost, 1958/9 to 1077/8.
Table 7. Labor’s share o f national income, 
after PAYE tax and cash benefits to 
persons.
Labour’s Tax/benefit
Year N et PA Y E
Cash
benefits
D ifferen ce 
as . 
% o f  GD P
Y ear
share
(From
effect
(From
Resulting
share
($m) ($m) Table 5) Table 6)
58/9 472 687 1.936 58/9 59.7 1.936 61.6
59/60 546 741 1.579 59/60 59.8 1.579 61.4
60/1 643 820 1.348 60/1 60.4 1.348 61.8
61/2 653 900 1.823 61/2 60.4 1.823 62.2
62/3 683 937 1.743 62/3 58.7 1.743 60.4
63/4 790 1029 1.479 63/4 57.3 1.479 58.8
64/5 991 1080 0.500 64/5 58.2 0.500 58.7
65/6 1160 1156 — 0.022 65/6 59.9 — 0.022 59.9
66/7 1324 1246 — 0.366 66/7 59.0 — 0.366 58.6
67/8 1507 1294 — 0.976 67/8 60.1 — 0.976 59.1
68/9 1727 1397 — 1.346 68/9 58.9 — 1.346 57.6
69/70 2084 1590 — 1.828 69/70 59.5 — 1.828 57.7
70/1 2432 1764 — 2.246 70/1 61.7 — 2.246 59.5
71/2 2888 2048 — 2.529 71/2 60.7 — 2.529 58.2
72/3 3161 2543 — 1.640 72/3 59.2 — 1.640 57.6
73/4 4238 3076 — 2.564 73/4 60.2 — 2.564 57.6
.74/5 6071 4320 — 3.245 74/5 64.5 -  3.245 61.3
75/6 7020 6089 -  1.482 75/6 63.3 — 1.482 61.8
76/7 8529 7388 -  1.569 76/7 61.5 — 1.569 59.9
77/8 9639 8279 — 1.703 77/8 61.0 -  1.703 59.3
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seems little justification for the claim that 
the wage share has exceeded some historic 
benchmark. True, real wages in Australia 
are higher than in many other countries, but 
they have always been so.
The wage share has increased in particular 
periods, particularly in recessions when, 
typ ica lly , output fa lls  faster than 
employment. The answer in this case is to 
increase the level of economic activity, not 
cut real wages — and anyway, the wage 
share will fall, other things being equal, 
when economic recovery picks up again.
This seems to leave the “real wage 
overhang” case hanging — though no doubt 
it will still be trotted out by employers, 
government ministers, academics and 
journalists to justify why other people’s 
incomes should be cut.
1. Calculated, in December 1978 prices, from 
seasonally adjusted gross non-farm product 
per civilian employee. Gross non-farm product 
(in December 1978 prices) went up from 
$20,925.4 million in the December quarter o f 
1974 to $23,567.0 million in the December 
quarter of last year, a 12.6 per cent increase. At 
the same time, the number o f civilian 
employees in private employment fell from 
3,550,500 to 2,240,000, a drop o f 8.7 per cent. 
This means productivity increased 23.4 per 
cent.
2. See the Treasury’s R ound-up o f  E conom ic 
S ta t is t ic s : Special Supplement, “ The 
Measurement of Real Unit Labour Costs” , 
September 1978, the Australian B ulletin o f  
Labour, March 1979, or the N ational 
T im es’  P.P. McGuiness almost any week this 
year.
3. Before 1958/9 income tax receipts are not 
given separately for wage anil salary m m w s.
T. O ’S., 
7.5.79.
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